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Abstract—A key pre-distribution scheme (KPS) based on 
multiple codewords of block codes is presented for wireless 
sensor networks. The connectivity and security of the proposed 
KPS, quantified in terms of probabilities of sharing common 
keys for communications of pairs of nodes and their resilience 
against colluding nodes, are analytically assessed. The analysis 
is applicable to both linear and nonlinear codes and is 
simplified in the case of maximum distance separable codes. It 
is shown that the multiplicity of codes significantly enhances 
the security and connectivity of KPS at the cost of a modest 
increase of the nodes storage. Numerical and simulation results 
are provided, which sheds light on the effect of system 
parameters of the proposed KPS on its complexity and 
performance. Specifically, it is shown that the probability of 
resilience of secure pairs against collusion of other nodes only 
reduces slowly as the number of colluding nodes increase.  
Keywords-Wireless Sensor Network, Security, Key Pre-
distribution,Block Codes 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Secure communication between nodes in WSNs involves 
interesting technical and research challenges [1]- [4]. The 
security requirements for WSNs are authentication, integrity 
and confidentiality. In addition, the specific features of sensor 
networks impose certain design requirements including key 
connectivity, resilience against colluding nodes, limited 
complexity (storage, processing and communications), and 
scalability [1]. In general, the security solutions for such 
networks relyon strong and efficient key distribution 
mechanisms. Considering the complexity constraints, key 
management in WSNs is primarily set up based on a symmetric 
key pre-distribution scheme (KPS). Using KPS, a special entity 
or authority acts as the key distribution center and loads the 
keys into the nodes prior to deployment  [1].            
For WSNs, the deterministic KPSs proposed in  [5]- [7] use 
a multi-dimensional grid. Specifically, each node is assigned a 
݇-tuple ID, which casts the nodes in a ݇ -dimensional grid. 
These schemes guarantee that any pair of nodes can find a 
common key either directly or indirectly through intermediate 
nodes. In fact, establishing indirect keys incurs communication 
overheads for the intermediate nodes and relies on their 
trustworthiness. 
In [8], a symmetric key generation schemebased on key pre-
distribution is presented that uses a maximum distance 
separable (MDS) code to secure pairwise communication of 
nodes in a network. This scheme guarantees direct common 
key between all pairs of nodes, at the cost of a complex key 
discovery phase of quadratic complexity. An alternative and 
more efficient deterministic KPS scheme based on MDS codes 
is suggested in [9], which also shows a stronger resilience 
against collusion.In this scheme,the ID of a node is encoded 
by an MDS code to generate the index of keys associated with 
that node. In  [14], a key management system based on MDS 
codes has been presented in which a publicly known MDS 
generator matrix is available to every node. Every node in the 
network uses this matrix and a random vector to generate 
codeword which is the secret key chain. In  [10],a KPS using 
Reed-Solomon codes is suggested. For this special case, the 
sharing probability (probability that two nodes find direct 
common key) and a bound on resilience against collusion are 
computed. The same performance measures are assessed for 
linear codes in  [13]. In [15],a general class of designs, termed 
“partially balanced t-designs” is introduced, that encompasses 
almost all of the reported designs for combinatorial key pre-
distribution schemes. 
In this paper, we present a key pre-distribution scheme 
based on multiple codewords of a block code and analyze its 
performance. The multiplicity of the codewords facilitates 
stronger security and may be administered by a single or 
multiple key assignment authorities. As presented in the next 
Section, the proposed scheme and the analyses of its sharing 
and resilience probabilities are applicable to all types of linear 
or nonlinear codes. Specifically, we derive an exact analytical 
expression to quantify the probability of resilience of the 
proposed KPS against ݎ  colluding nodes thatparticularly 
simplifies in the special case of MDS codes. The results show 
that the resilience probability improves exponentiallyfast with 
the code multiplicity at the cost of a modest increase of storage 
requirements.Numerical and simulation results in Section III 
demonstrate the accuracy of the analysis and quantify the 
performance and complexity of the proposed KPS. The article 
is concluded in Section IV. 
II. MBKPS AND RESILIENCE ANALYSIS  
A block code ܥ(݊, ݇) −ݍ over a field ofݍ symbols, ܨ௤, is a 
set of ݍ௞  vectors of length ݊ called codewords. Associated with 
this, is an encoder which maps an input݇-tuple over ܨ௤to its 
corresponding codeword  [12].  Below, we present a key pre-
GOD 
 
distribution scheme based on multiple codewords of such a 
block code, herein referred to as Multiple Block Code Key Pre-
Distribution Scheme, MBKPS. For better presentation, we 
begin with the case where only one codeword is used for key 
assignment of each single node (BKPS).  
A. Key assignment inBKPS 
Consider a network with ܰ nodes. In key assignment phase 
of the scheme, we first assign each node an ID as a ݍ -ary 
vector of ݇ symbols where ܰ ≤ ݍ௞ . Then this ID is encoded by 
a block code ܥ(݊,݇)-ݍ producing a codeword which serves as 
key-index ID of the node. As described in Table 1, 
corresponding to each symbol of key-index ID of a node, one 
key is assigned to thisnode. 
Table 1. Key assignment algorithm of BKPS 
1. Aݍ-ary vectorof length ݇ = ඃlog௤ܰඇ is assigned to each 
node as its ID.  
2. For node ܣ, its ID ࢻ௞ෞ = {ߙො଴,ߙොଵ, … ,ߙො௞ିଵ}is encoded by 
the block code ܥ(݊,݇) - ݍ toproduce its key-index ID 
ࢻ(௡,௞) = {ߙ଴ ,ߙଵ , … ,ߙ௡ିଵ},ߙ௜ ∈ ܨ௤ ,∀݅. 
3. Prepare a key pool withݍ × ݊keysࡷ = {݇଴, … , ݇௤௡ିଵ}. 
4. The keys k(i), 0 ≤ i ≤ ݊ − 1, is assigned to node A with 
key-index ID, ߙ(௡,௞), as follows  
݇(݅) = ݇௙(௜) ,       ݂(݅) = ߙ௜  × ݊ + ݅,     ݇௙(௜) ∈ ࡷ 
______________________________________________ 
It is noteworthy that the presented BKPS is technically 
equivalent to the KPS proposed in [10],however, the key 
assignment formulation presented here is more concise. 
Specifically,the BKPS algorithm in Table 1 relies on 
amapping function, ݂(. ), in step 4 that is a function of a single 
variable, whereas the equivalent mapping in the KPS of  [10]is 
a function of two variables. 
B. Key assignment inmutipleBKPS 
Toenhance the security and/or reducing the dependency on 
trust to one authority, we propose the multipleBKPS(MBKPS). 
For a scenario with ܯ authorities, each node is assigned one ID 
of length ݇  by each of the authorities independently. Each݇ 
symbol ID is encoded by the block code ܥ(݊,݇)-ݍ. Therefore, 
a ݍ-ary key-index ID of length ܯ × ݊ is assigned to each node. 
Each authority assigns the keys to its associated ݊ symbolsin 
thekey-index ID. The MBKPS is secure against collusion of 
less than ܯ  authorities as it does not allow revealing all 
common keys between the two nodes. Table 2 shows the key 
assignment algorithm of the MBKPS. 
Table2. Key assignment algorithm of MBKPS 
1. An ID is assigned to each node as a vector of length ݇ 
over ܨ௤by each authority ݉ , 0 ≤ ݉ ≤ܯ − 1where݇ =
ඃlog௤ ܰඇ and ܰ is the number of nodes. 
2. For node ܣ, its ID {ߙො௠௞ ,ߙො௠௞ାଵ, … ,ߙො(௠ାଵ)௞ିଵ}(assigned 
by authority ݉)is encoded by the block code ܥ(݊,݇)-ݍ to 
produce its associated part of key-index ID {ߙ௠௡ ,ߙ௠௡ାଵ, … ,ߙ(௠ାଵ)௡ିଵ},ߙ௜ ,ߙపෝ ∈ ܨ௤ ,∀݅. 
3. The authority ݉ , 0 ≤ ݉ ≤ ܯ − 1  prepares a key pool 
containing݊ × ݍ keysࡷ௠ = {݇௠௡ , … , ݇(௠ାଵ)௡௤ିଵ}. 
4. The authority m  assigns keys ݇(݅) , ݉݊ ≤ ݅ ≤ (݉ +1)݊ − 1, to node A based on its key-index ID as follows: 
݇(݅) = ݇௙(௜), ݂(݅) = ߙ௜ܯ݊ + ݅ , ݇௙(௜) ∈ ܭ௠ 
_____________________________________________ 
For ܯ = 1, the presented MBKPS reduces to BKPS. 
Remark 1.The MBKPSis presented assuming ܯ 
authorities.Alternatively, a single authority may opt forMBKPS 
for enhanced security.This is accomplished when 
itassigns ܯindependent key-index IDs of length ݊to a node and 
runsthe BKPS for every part with independent key pools. 
Property 1.Using ܥ(݊, ݇) - ݍ  and based on MBKPS key 
assignment, ܯ × ݊ distinct keys are assigned to each node. 
Property 2. The proposed MB KPS with ܯ  authorities and 
using the code ܥ(݊,݇)-ݍ incursthe local and global costs of 
ܯ × ݊ andܯ × ݊ × ݍ , respectively. This indicates that both 
costs increase linearly as the number of authorities increases. 
Property 3.Eachauthority assigns its own portion of the node 
ID and key-index ID independent of other authorities. Hence, if 
a collusion of authorities/nodes hasaccess to the common keys 
of twonodes dueto a givenpart of their key-index IDs, they may 
still be protected against collusion by keys corresponding to 
other parts of their key-index IDs. As a result, if the probability 
that all common keys related to one authority areidentifiedby a 
collusion of nodes is ܲ, this probability decreases to ܲெ by ܯ 
authorities. 
The key discovery phase of the MBKPS is very simple and of 
low complexity. To find common keys, two nodes exchange 
their key-index IDs. Each node then finds common keys by 
comparing the two key-index IDs and identifying the common 
symbols.The probability that two nodes find at least one 
common key is defined as sharing probability. Based on the 
computed sharing probability of BKPS in [10],we provide the 
sharing probability of MBKPS as follows. 
Proposition 1.Using blockcode ܥ(݊,݇)-ݍ, if ௦ܲ௛is the sharing 
probability of BKPS,for MBKPS key assignment with ܯ 
authorities, the sharing probability is: 
௦ܲ௛
ெ = 1− (1− ௦ܲ௛)ெ . (1) 
Proof: The probability that two nodes do not find any common 
key associated with one authority is 1− ௦ܲ௛ . As ܯ key-index 
ID parts are assigned independently, then the probability that 
two nodes do not have any common key in ܯ parts of their 
key-index ID is equal to (1− ௦ܲ௛)ெ . Hence, the sharing 
probability of MBKPS for ܯ authorities is obtained as in (1). 
As evident from Proposition 1, the sharing probability 
approaches 1 asܯ increases. 
C. ݎ-resilience of MBKPS 
The resilience of a key pre-distribution scheme against 
colluding nodes, ݎ -resilience, is defined as the ratio of the 
secure pairwise communication channels over the total number 
of node pairs. A pair of nodes is secure against collusion of ݎ 
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nodes, if there exists a common key between these two nodes 
that is not in the union of the set of keys assigned to the ݎ 
colluding nodes. The corresponding symbol with such a secure 
key is referred to as a collusion free symbol. 
Proposition 2.Using block code ܥ(݊,݇)-ݍ for BKPS, the total 
number of node pairs that has secure common key against anݎ-
collusion is 
ܦ = ෍ ෍ (−1)௝ିଵ ௜ܸభ ,௜మ,…,௜ೕ
௜భ ,௜మ,…,௜ೕ∈{ଵ,…,௡}
௡ିௗ೘೔೙
௝ୀଵ
 
(2) 
௜ܸభ,௜మ ,…,௜ೕ = ෍ ൭ܪ௜భ,௜మ,…,௜ೕ௤భ,௤మ,…,௤ೕ2 ൱௤భ,௤మ,…,௤ೕ
௤೟∈௎೔೟ ,∀ଵஸ௧ஸ௝
 
(3) 
in which, ܪ௜భ ,௜మ,…,௜ೕ௤భ,௤మ ,…,௤ೕ  is the number of codewords with symbol 
values ݍଵ ,ݍଶ, … , ݍ௝ in coordinates  ݅ଵ, ݅ଶ, … , ௝݅, respectively and 
௜ܷ೟ is the set of collusion free symbols in coordinate ݅௧ . 
Proof:Each pair of the nodes is secure against ݎ-collusion,if 
they have identicalcollusion free symbolsin the same positions 
in their key-index IDs. Consider ऎasthe set of all pairs of 
nodes secured against ݎ-collusion. Let ܦ represent the number 
of elements of the set ऎ. It is clear that ऎ can be viewedas the 
union of the sets ठ௜ , ݅ = 1, … , ݊, in which ठ௜ is the set of all 
pairs of nodes withsecure key (common collusion free symbol) 
in coordinate ݅,i.e.,ऎ = ⋃ ठ௜௡௜ୀଵ . Let ௜ܸ and ௜ܸభ ,௜మ,…,௜ೕdenote the 
number of elements of the setsठ௜and ⋂ ठ௜೟ , ݅௧ ∈ {1, … ,݊}௝௧ୀଵ . 
Therefore, the number of pairs that have at least݆  common 
collusion free symbol symbols is equal to 
∑ ௜ܸభ,௜మ ,…,௜ೕ௜భ,௜మ,…,௜ೕ∈{ଵ,…,௡} . Hence, the number of pairs having at 
least one common symbol, ܦ, is given by (2). Note that the 
term (−1)௝ିଵ in (2) help deduct the pairs with more than ݆ 
common symbols in ∑ ௜ܸభ,௜మ,…,௜ೕ௜భ,௜మ,…,௜ೕ∈{ଵ,…,௡} . As the hamming 
distance of the code is ݀௠௜௡ , apair of nodes have at most 
݊ − ݀௠௜௡ identical symbols. As a result,for ݆ > ݊ − ݀௠௜௡, we 
have ௜ܸభ,௜మ,…,௜ೕ = 0.  
Now we compute ௜ܸభ,௜మ,…,௜ೕ as follows. ௜ܸభ,௜మ,…,௜ೕis the number of 
pairs of nodes with identical collusion free symbols in all 
coordinates݅ଵ, ݅ଶ, … , ௝݅ . Therefore, it can be rewritten as follows 
௜ܸభ,௜మ ,…,௜ೕ = ෍ ௜ܸభ,௜మ ,…,௜ೕ௤భ,௤మ,…,௤ೕ
௤భ,௤మ,…,௤ೕ
௤೟∈௎೔೟ ,∀ଵஸ௧ஸ௝
 (4) 
in which, ௜ܸభ,௜మ,…,௜ೕ௤భ,௤మ,…,௤ೕ  is the number of pairs of nodes with 
identical collusion free symbols of ݍଵ, ݍଶ, … ,ݍ௝  in coordinates 
݅ଵ, ݅ଶ, … , ௝݅ . Consider ܪ௜భ,௜మ,…,௜ೕ௤భ ,௤మ,…,௤ೕ as the number of codewords 
with symbol values ݍଵ,ݍଶ , … , ݍ௝  in coordinates ݅ଵ, ݅ଶ, … , ௝݅ . 
Obviously, we have ௜ܸభ,௜మ,…,௜ೕ௤భ,௤మ,…,௤ೕ = ቆு೔భ,೔మ,…,೔ೕ೜భ,೜మ,…,೜ೕଶ ቇ, and the proof is 
complete. 
The ݎ-resilence probability of the BKPS using block code 
ܥ(݊,݇)-ݍis represented by ௥ܲ௘  and is defined as the ratio of ܦ 
over the total number of choices of pairs of nodes,i.e, 
௥ܲ௘ = ܦ
ቀ௤
ೖ
ଶ
ቁ
 
(5) 
in which ܦ is given by Proposition 2. 
Remark 2. The proposed analysis of the ݎ -resilience 
probability of BKPS holds generally for any type of block code 
andis not restricted to linear codes. 
Proposition 3.Using block codeܥ(݊,݇)-ݍ  for MBKPS key 
assignment with M authorities, the ݎ-resilience probability is 
௥ܲ௘
ெ = 1− (1 − ௥ܲ௘)ெ . (6) 
Proof: The probability that two nodes do not find any common 
collusion free symbol (secure key)associated with one 
authority is 1 − ௥ܲ௘ . As ܯ  key-index ID parts are assigned 
independently, then the probability that two nodes do not have 
any common secure key in ܯ parts of their key-index ID is 
equal to (1− ௥ܲ௘)ெ . Hence, the ݎ -resilience probability of 
MBKPS for ܯ authorities is obtained as in (6).As evident in 
Proposition 3, the ݎ-resilience probability approaches 1 as ܯ 
increases. 
D. ݎ-resilience of MBKPS for MDS codes 
For a linear code ܥ(݊, ݇) −ݍ , the number of codewords 
with the same symbol in a coordinate is exactly ݍ௞ିଵ [11]. The 
value of each coordinate is distributed uniform over ܩܨ(ݍ)for 
linear codes over this field.Hence, the probability that none of 
the ݎcolluding nodes at a given coordinate assumes a certain 
symbol is (1− ଵ
௤
)௥. As such, the average number of collusion 
free symbolsin a given coordinate for a linear code is given by 
ݑ = ݍ(1 − ଵ
௤
)௥.  
For MDS codes, the number of codewordswith identical 
symbols in 1 ≤ ݐ ≤ ݇ positions is exactly ݍ௞ି௧  [11]. Therefore, 
for the MDS code ܥ(݊, ݇)-ݍ,݀௠௜௡ = ݊ − ݇ + 1, and we have : 
ܪ௜భ,௜మ,…,௜ೕ௤భ,௤మ,…,௤ೕ = ݍ௞ି௝ , 0 ≤ ݆ ≤ ݇ − 1. (7) 
It is straight forward to obtain the following 
ܦ = ∑ (−1)௝ିଵݑ௝ ቀ݊௝ቁ ቀݍ݇−݆ଶ ቁ௞ିଵ௝ୀଵ . (8) 
III. PERFROMANCE EVALUATION 
In this Section, the performance of the proposed BKPS is 
assessed via numerical and simulation results.We consider a 
network with ܰ nodes of limited storage to store the codewords 
and keys. In order to establish MBKPS based on ܥ(݊, ݇)-ݍ 
with ܯ authorities, each node needs to store ܯ × ݊  symbols 
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related to its key-index ID and also ܯ × ݊ keys. If the keys are 
chosen from the field ܨ௤ᇱ , then each node needs ܵ =
ܯ݊ logଶ ݍ + ܯ݊ logଶ ݍ′ bits of storage. 
Fig.1 depicts the simulationresults for the ݎ-resilience of 
BKPS for two MDS codes of (14,2)-16 and (30, 2)-32. For 
comparison, we consider the average performance of fifty 
randomly generated linear codes with the same parameters. 
The results are averaged over random sets of colluding nodes. 
It is observed that for BKPS with thesamecode parameters, 
݊ ,  ݇ , ݍ , the MDS code demonstrates a strongerresilience.In 
addition, the figuredemonstrates that the simulations coincide 
with the proposed analysisof BKPS resilience performance. 
Fig. 2demonstrates how increasing the memory storage of 
nodes can be used by the proposed MBKPS algorithm 
forimprovingthe resilience of the system.The ݎ -resilience is 
evaluated for ܰ = 1000,ݍ′ = 64and certaincodes andvalues of 
ܯ . It is observed that a largernode storage, ܵ  (bits),when 
effectively used within the MBKPSimproves the resilience of 
the system significantly. For example increasing ܵ  from 20 
kbits to 50kbits can improve resilience against 100 colluding 
nodes by about 100%. 
Fig.3 compares the performance of the proposed analysis of 
resilience (which coincides with the true performance) and the 
lower bound proposed in  [10] based on the definition in 
Section II.C. It is evident that the performance gap increases 
withݎ, and affirms the value of the proposed analysis.  
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, a key pre-distribution scheme based on multiple 
block codes was proposed for WSN applications. While this 
multiplicity may be administered by single or multiple key 
assignment authorities, it was analytically proven that it 
improves the sharing and resilience probabilities exponentially 
fast, at the cost of only a linear increment of memory storage. 
The presented analysis also demonstrated that the resilience 
probability approaches zero exponentially slow as the number 
of colluding nodes grows. Future research in this direction 
could investigate the optimal design of codes and system 
parameters under specific complexity constraints for nodes.  
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Fig.1.ݎ-resilience vs. number of colluding nodes forBKPSwith 
different MDS and random linear codes. 
 
Fig.2. ݎ -resilience vs. number of colluding nodes 
forMBKPSwith MDS codes and different values of ܵ ; ܰ =1000. 
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Fig.3. Comparison of the proposed ݎ -resilience probability 
with the ݎ-resilience lower bound provided in [10]. 
 
 
